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The Adversity/ Hysteresis Effect
Depression- Era Productivity 
Growth in the US Railroad Sector
Alexander J. Field
Throughout its history the United States has endured cycles of  fi nancial 
boom and bust. Boom periods have been marked by weakened or absent 
regulation of the fi nancial sector and a growing willingness on the part of 
households, nonfi nancial businesses, and fi nancial businesses to hold riskier 
assets and to fi nance these positions with higher leverage (higher debt to 
equity ratios). These twin engines fuel fi nancial sector profi ts and remu-
neration so long as asset prices continue to appreciate, but they (especially 
the trend toward higher leverage) render the system vulnerable when asset 
bubbles burst. In the boom phase, as the fi nancial system becomes more 
interconnected, with narrowing capital cushions and complex webs of rights 
to receive from and obligations to pay to, it becomes more fragile and vulner-
able. The failure of one fi nancial institution now has the potential to bring 
down others like a row of dominoes, with the potential for severe impacts 
on the real economy as credit fl ows seize up (Minsky 1986).
This cycle was evident in the late 1920s (boom) going into the 1930s (bust), 
in the initial decade of the twenty- fi rst century, and in a number of inter-
vening and less severe cycles such as that associated with the Savings and 
Loan crisis of the late 1980s (Field 1992). In each of these instances, while 
the upswing of the cycle supercharged the accumulation of physical capital, 
particularly structures, its aftermath retarded it. The boom and bust cycle of 
physical accumulation has had predictable impacts on productivity growth 
in the short run. The upswing of the fi nancial cycle lays the groundwork 
for a subsequent contraction in physical accumulation, which, amplifi ed 
by multiplier effects and only partially counteracted by fi scal and monetary 
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policy, contributes to the decline in aggregate demand that induces recession, 
which has historically produced a short- run adverse effect on both labor 
productivity and total factor productivity (TFP).
This adverse effect has been refl ected in growth retardation and, in many 
instances, outright declines in productivity measures. Why? The slowdown 
in physical accumulation produces a growing output gap, the result of the 
reduction in spending on structures and equipment amplifi ed by multiplier 
effects. Productivity growth slows or declines as falling output collides with 
relatively infl exible costs of fi xed capital, particularly structures.1 Between 
1890 and 2004, an increase in the unemployment rate of 1 percentage point 
was statistically associated with a reduction in the TFP growth rate for the 
private nonfarm economy of about 0.9 percent. This short- run cyclical effect 
persisted through periods characterized by both high and low trend growth 
rates. A weaker procyclical infl uence on labor productivity growth can also 
be identifi ed (Field 2010).
Gordon (2010) has suggested that the historically inverse relationship 
between the output gap and productivity may recently have disappeared. 
There is increasing evidence, however, that economic downturn in the fi rst 
decade of the twenty- fi rst century will in fact be associated with weak or 
negative TFP growth as was the case between 1929 and 1933, and more 
generally throughout the entire period from 1890 to 2004. Advance between 
2007 and 2008—the worst year of  the Great Recession—was negative: 
– 0.2 percent per year. There appeared to be recovery in 2010, but in spite 
of this, the level of TFP was lower in 2009 than it had been in 2005 (http:/ / 
www.bls.gov, accessed October 20, 2011; data is for the private nonfarm 
economy). Even including the sharply higher index for 2010, TFP growth 
between 2005 and 2010 was 0.6 percent per year, barely higher than rates 
during the recent dark age (1973– 1995) of productivity growth. All of that 
increase is due to the 2010 number, which may be subject to revision.
And although output per hour rose during 2009 and 2010 after declining, 
compared with 2007:4, in three out of the four quarters of 2008, it fell again 
between the fi rst and second quarter of  2011. Recessions continue to be 
associated with declines in productivity or at least growth retardation.
These issues, however, involve shorter run effects since business cycles 
are, by defi nition, shorter run phenomena. What long- run effects, if  any, 
might the fi nancial cycle, and the cycle of physical accumulation to which 
it helps give rise, have on productivity growth? This requires consideration 
of potentially benefi cial and adverse consequences of both boom and bust. 
The most obvious infl uences are clearly negative. In the later stages of  a 
credit boom, as lending standards deteriorate, and as fi nancial institutions 
1. Although “voluntary” labor hoarding is referenced frequently in the literature as an expla-
nation of procyclical productivity, I have argued that the involuntary “hoarding” of capital is 
in fact of greater signifi cance (Field 2010).
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push credit on borrowers rather than just responding to their demands for 
it, it becomes increasingly less likely that physical capital will be allocated to 
its best uses. The wrong types of capital goods may be produced, and they 
may be sold or leased to the wrong fi rms or installed or built in the wrong 
places. These problems are more easily remedied for equipment, because 
producer durables are physically moveable, and in any event, are relatively 
short lived.
Structures are longer lived and generally immobile and in their case a 
confi guration decided upon in haste in the upswing may foreclose other 
infrastructural developmental paths. It is not always simply a problem of 
overbuilding, with an overhang that can be worked off in a few years. Some 
decisions about structural investment are irreversible, or reversible only at 
great cost. In growth models, more physical capital accumulation is gener-
ally preferable to less, but the reality is that in some cases the economy would 
have been better off (because of disposal and remediation costs) had poorly 
thought out prior investment not occurred at all.
Zoning and other types of  planning and land use regulation can par-
tially mitigate these effects. These were largely absent in the 1920s, and so the 
adverse effects on the revival of accumulation were more acute in the inter-
war period than they were in the 1980s or will likely be in the 2010s. During 
and after the Depression, and partly in response to it, and alongside the 
more well- known apparatus of fi nancial sector regulation, municipalities 
developed a locally administered system controlling the physical accumula-
tion of structures (both government and privately owned). The regulation 
of land use and construction survived the deregulatory enthusiasms of the 
last several decades more successfully than did the restraints on fi nance. 
Why this was so is an interesting story in itself. It had to do in part with the 
lower concentration of the real estate development industry, the fact that 
battles would have had to have been fought at the level of hundreds of local 
jurisdictions rather than primarily at the federal level, and the fact that land 
use regulation and local building codes, although sometimes perceived as 
an irritant, did not hinder the potential for private sector profi t as much 
as did the legacies of New Deal regulation of the fi nancial sector. Still, the 
real estate collapse that began in 2006 has been geographically specifi c in 
the severity of its impact, and it is possible some new construction may well 
end up evolving into blighted neighborhoods that will ultimately need to 
be razed.
The second adverse impact on potential output takes place during the 
downturn. In the bust phase of the cycle, as the fi nancial crisis disrupts lend-
ing and other fi nancial intermediation, physical accumulation slows down. 
Assuming that the speculative fever has broken, we can now expect the bor-
rowing and lending that takes place to be more considered. But because 
both borrowers’ and lenders’ balance sheets are weaker, loan transactions 
are perceived as riskier, and less of them take place. So the bust imposes a 
582    Alexander J. Field
purely quantitative loss to potential output in the form of accumulation 
not undertaken. On the expenditure side, a recession represents foregone 
opportunities for investment as well as consumption. Stilled productive 
capacity could have been used to add to the nation’s physical capital stock 
but was not. Idle productive capacity (representing the unused service fl ows 
of  both labor and capital) is like an unsold airplane seat or hotel room. 
The dated service fl ows represent potential gone forever if  not used. And 
so some houses, warehouses, apartment buildings, or producer durables are 
not acquired or built that could have been.
In sum, a fi nancial boom/ bust cycle misallocates physical capital in an 
upswing, in some cases with irreversible or expensively reversible adverse 
consequences. And the downswing deprives the economy of capital forma-
tion that might have taken place in the absence of the recession. In contrast 
with an imagined world in which accumulation took place at steadier rates, 
both of these effects on aggregate supply have to be entered on the negative 
side in an accounting of the effect on the trend growth rate of productivity 
of the boom/ bust fi nancial cycle and the closely related cycle of physical 
capital accumulation.
The question I now pose is whether there is some compensatory effect 
during a recession—some positive impact on the long- run growth of poten-
tial output. In other words, is there a silver lining to depression? A subter-
ranean theme in some economic commentary seems almost mystically to 
view depression as a purifying experience, not only purging balance sheets 
of bad investments and excessive leverage, but also refocusing economic en-
ergies on what is truly important, and perhaps stimulating creative juices in 
a way that expands the supply of useful innovations. This style of argument 
is refl ected in Posner (2009) in a chapter entitled, “A Silver Lining?” and 
it echoes Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon’s approving Depression- era 
encouragement to “[l]iquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, 
liquidate real estate. . . . It will purge the rottenness out of the system. . . . 
People will work harder, live a more moral life” (Hoover 1952, 30).
Is it possible for a diet of feast then famine to toughen up the economic 
patient, ultimately allowing the economy to grow more rapidly, compensat-
ing for the effect on potential output of misallocated capital in the boom 
and foregone accumulation in the trough? The years of the Great Depres-
sion (1929– 1941) were the most prolonged period in US economic history 
in which output remained substantially below potential. That period was 
also the most technologically progressive of any comparable period in US 
economic history (Field 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2008, 2011a, 2011b; see also 
Schmookler 1966; Mensch 1979). Is there a connection? It is natural to ask 
whether there was and whether, because the Depression experienced such 
pronounced advance in this regard, we could expect some boost to longer 
run growth as a direct consequence of our current recession.
With respect to recent economic history, Bureau of Labor Statistics pro-
The Adversity/ Hysteresis Effect    583
ductivity data show that the decade- long information technology (IT) pro-
ductivity boom ran out of steam in 2005. Although TFP for the private non-
farm economy grew at 1.57 percent per year between 1995 and 2005, it grew 
very slowly between 2005 and 2007 (0.4 percent per year, declined in 2008, 
and was lower in 2009 than it had been in 2005 [BLS Series MPU491007, 
accessed October 20, 2011]). We will not have determinative evidence on the 
longer run trajectory of TFP in the 2010s for some time, since trend growth 
in my view can only be reliably measured between business cycle peaks. Thus 
we will need to await the closing of the output gap and the economy’s return 
to potential to get a good reading. Even then there will be a question—as 
there is in the case of the Great Depression—as to how much of the advance 
would have taken place anyway. Still, the issue of whether we can expect a 
“recession boost” to potential output is obviously an important one, and it 
is natural to turn to the Depression experience for possible indications as to 
whether this is likely. That long- run trajectory bears on a number of policy 
issues, including the adequacy of  Social Security funding, our ability to 
address escalating health costs, and the more general question of what will 
happen to our material standard of living.
I offer a nuanced response to the question of whether 1929 through 1941 
bred productivity improvements that might foreshadow what will happen 
over the next decade. The issue is best approached by thinking of  TFP 
growth across the 1930s as resulting from the confl uence of three tributaries. 
The fi rst was the continuing high rate of TFP growth within manufacturing, 
the result of the maturing of a privately funded research and development 
system. The second was associated with spillovers from the buildout of the 
surface road network, which boosted private sector productivity, particu-
larly in transportation and wholesale and retail distribution (Field 2011a). 
The third infl uence, which I call the adversity/ hysteresis effect, refl ects the 
ways in which crisis sometimes leads to new and innovative solutions with 
persistent effects. It is another name for what adherents of the silver lining 
thesis describe, and it is a mechanism refl ected in the folk wisdom that neces-
sity is the mother of invention.
In the absence of the economic downturn, we would probably have got-
ten roughly the same contribution from the fi rst two tributaries. That is, 
certain scientifi c and technological opportunities, perhaps an unusually 
high number of  them, were ripe for development in the 1930s, and they 
would have been pursued at about the same rate even in circumstances of 
full employment. With or without the depression Wallace Carothers would 
have invented nylon; Donald Douglass would have brought forth the DC3. 
Similarly, by the end of the 1920s, automobile and truck production and 
registrations had outrun the capabilities of the surface road infrastructure. 
Strong political alliances in favor of building more and improved roads had 
been formed, and issues regarding the layout of  a national route system 
had been hashed out by the end of 1926 (Finch 1992; Paxson 1946). It is 
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highly probable that the buildout of the surface road network would have 
continued at roughly the same pace in the absence of the Depression. So it 
is the third effect, the kick in the rear of unemployment and fi nancial melt-
down, that is most relevant in terms of a possible causal association between 
depression and productivity advance.
The adversity/ hysteresis mechanism is familiar to households unexpect-
edly faced with the loss of a wage earner or suddenly cut off from easy access 
to credit that had been formerly available. Under such circumstances, suc-
cessful families inventory their assets and focus on how they can get more 
out of what they already have, not just how they can get more.
Adversity does cause some people to work harder, just as it causes some 
people to take more risks: these are people for whom the income or wealth 
effects of adversity dominate the substitution effects. For others, the sub-
stitution effect leads to withdrawal from the labor force or discouragement. 
In more severe forms this is evident in a variety of  mental and physical 
disorders that may show up in aggregate statistics on alcoholism, depres-
sion, suicide, and divorce. The overall effect on innovation, work effort, 
and risk taking is not easy to predict, given that, in economic terms, both 
income and substitution effects are operative, and that they pull in opposite 
directions (blanket opposition to tax increases based on their effects on 
aggregate supply typically focuses only on substitution effects). There is 
merit in the adage that what does not kill you makes you stronger. It’s just 
that sometimes it kills you. Not all families or fi rms are resilient, and in 
some instances adversity destroys them. So I am skeptical overall that we 
can take an unqualifi ed optimistic view of the effects of economic adversity 
on innovation and creativity.
These qualifi cations aside, there is one important sector that appears to 
have benefi ted from the silver lining effect during the Depression, and that 
is railroads. Railroads confronted multiple challenges. They faced adverse 
demand conditions specifi c to the industry that would have continued to 
plague fi rms with or without the Depression. The automobile was already 
eroding passenger traffic in the 1920s, and trucking was changing the freight 
business by providing strong competition in the short haul sector. For an 
industry faced with these challenges and characterized by heavy fi xed costs, 
the downturn in aggregate economic activity was particularly devastating, 
and pushed many railroads into receivership. Access to capital was dis-
rupted, although some ailing roads received loans from the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation and, paradoxically, bankrupt rails, no longer required 
to meet obligations to their original creditors, could obtain credit, espe-
cially short- term fi nancing for equipment purchases, with greater ease than 
lines that had not gone bankrupt. But access to cheap fi fty- year mortgage 
money—widely available in the 1920s—was pretty much gone (Schiffman 
2003). Railroads responsible for roughly one- third of  US track mileage 
were in receivership by the late 1930s, and had their fi nancing constraints 
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somewhat relaxed. A corollary, however, is that railroads responsible for the 
remaining two- thirds were not in receivership. With generally weak balance 
sheets, they faced limited access to credit.
Confronted with these challenges, both labor and management took a 
hard look at what they had, and worked to use their hours and capital re-
sources more effectively. The result was a substantial increase in the rate of 
total factor productivity growth, due to innovations in equipment, struc-
tures, and logistics. Both capital and labor inputs declined substantially.2 
Underutilized sections of  track, for example, were decommissioned (see 
fi gure 12.6),3 and the net stocks of  both railroad structures and railroad 
equipment declined (fi gure 12.2) as did the number of  employees (fi gure 
12.7). Rolling stock went down by one- third, and the number of employees 
declined by almost that percentage.
Superimposed on this overall rationalization of the rail system were im-
provements in locomotives, rolling stock, and permanent way. Steam loco-
motives (and even some of the early electrics) began to be replaced with 
diesel- electrics, an almost unambiguously superior technology, particularly 
in comparison with steam. Diesel- electrics did not require an hour for “fi r-
ing up” to deliver full power, did away with the need for rewatering stops 
(to replenish the boiler’s source of steam), reduced or eliminated the need 
for refueling, and made unnecessary the locomotive position of fi reman. 
If  properly equipped, diesel- electrics could operate on both electrifi ed or 
nonelectrifi ed portions of  a system, drawing power from overhead wires 
where available or generating their own when it was not, which made them 
considerably more fl exible than pure electric locomotives.4 Overall, diesel-
 electrics had much lower maintenance costs, produced less wear and tear 
on tracks, and had fuel efficency that was at least three times that of steam 
locomotives (Stover 1997, 213). Although diesel- electrics still represented 
a small fraction of the total locomotive stock in 1941, their introduction 
and development is testimony to the engineering advances that were being 
pushed forward during the Depression years.
Passenger cars also improved, with more of them constructed from light-
weight aluminum and alloys; streamlining became the aesthetic hallmark 
2. Posner captures the silver lining hypothesis insofar as it applies to productivity in these 
words: “A depression increases the efficiency with which both labor and capital inputs are used 
by businesses, because it creates an occasion and an imperative for reducing slack. . . . When 
a depression ends, a fi rm motivated by the recession to reduce slack in its operations will have 
lower average costs than before” (2009, 222– 23).
3. First track mileage operated was roughly unchanged from 1919 to 1929 (263,707, declining 
to 262,546). But between 1929 and 1941, it dropped 5.9 percent (262,546 to 245,240) (Statistical 
Abstract 1945, table 521, 470). As fi rst track mileage declined, however, the relative importance 
of secondary trackage increased (see Stover 1997, 182– 83).
4. Contrary to some misconceptions, a diesel- electric does not use a diesel motor directly 
to power the locomotive. The diesel engine drives a generator, the electrical output of which 
drives an electric motor that powers the engine. It is thus closer in design philosophy to what 
the new Chevrolet Volt claims than say, the Toyota Prius.
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for both locomotive-drawn cars and self- propelled articulated or single car 
(such as the Budd car) trains. Freight cars became larger. The introduction 
of electro- pneumatic retarders improved the efficiency of gravity switching 
yards. Without them “it would have been a virtual impossibility to handle 
war traffic through major centers” (Parmalee 1950, 43).
Complementing these improvements in equipment, investments in per-
manent way along with logistical innovation enabled railroads, in spite of 
substantial reductions in the numbers of  locomotives, rolling stock, and 
employees, to record slightly more revenue ton miles of freight and book 
almost as many passenger miles in 1941 as they had in 1929. What were some 
of these improvements? First, more sections of the system were electrifi ed.5 
Second, centralized traffic control systems allowed more intensive use of 
trackage without jeopardizing safety. Centralized traffic control was a re-
fi nement of block signaling in which the operation of trains could be moni-
tored and controlled by a single dispatcher, who scanned a central display 
board providing real time location information for all trains in a division. 
Track mileage operated using this system increased more than sixfold be-
tween 1929 and 1941, from 341 to 2,163 miles, and then more than tripled 
during the war years (Stover 1997, 184). The innovation was particularly 
important in heavily used portions of the rail network, since it allowed sub-
stantial increases in utilization without compromising safety.
The most far- reaching and signifi cant organizational innovation, how-
ever, was the negotiation and implementation of  unlimited freight inter-
change. Agreements worked out during the Depression allowed the free 
movement of  freight cars among different systems, so that, for example, 
a boxcar could move from one road to another without needing to break 
cargo. And when it reached its destination (even though outside of the sys-
tem that owned it) the car could be reloaded rather than sent back empty 
to territory controlled by the originating road.6 Cooperation was enabled 
by a standard schedule of rental payments along with agreements so that 
repairs and maintenance, if  necessary, could be undertaken in yards owned 
by a railroad different from the one that owned the car.7
Unlimited interchange resulted in large reductions in the transactions 
5. The most important Depression era project was electrifi cation of the Pennsylvania Rail-
road from New York to Washington and beyond.
6. In the fi rst half  of  the twentieth century most transcontinental rail passengers had to 
change in Chicago. As one writer put it, the city was “a phantom Chinese wall that splits 
America in half.” After World War II the president of the Chesapeake and Ohio published 
advertisements announcing provocatively that “a hog could travel across the United States 
without changing cars but a human could not.” The ads were intended to jumpstart fl agging 
passenger traffic by showcasing the removal of Chicago as an “invisible barrier.” But the copy 
is indirect testimony to what unlimited freight interchange had achieved during the 1930s 
(Stover 1997, 216– 17).
7. The system eventually evolved to incorporate freight cars owned by third parties, so that 
today more than half  of freight rolling stock is owned by entities other than railroads (Richter 
2005, 35).
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costs associated with moving freight long distances. It was facilitated by 
moves toward equipment standardization initiated during the Federal gov-
ernment’s takeover of the railroads during World War I (Stover 1997, 175; 
Longman 2009), and pushed forward in the 1930s by the Association of 
American Railroads. The AAR, formed in October 1934 through the merger 
of fi ve industry trade groups, vetted and approved, from the standpoint of 
both safety and efficiency, changes in freight car design, and took the lead 
in developing and promulgating industry standards for operations, inter-
change, and, ultimately, interoperability. These were and are published in 
its Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices. Because railroads are 
a highly interconnected network industry, standard setting takes on more 
importance in facilitating efficiency improvement than is the case in truck-
ing, for example, because failure of one small part of a system can have much 
larger deleterious consequences.
During the Depression railroads faced strained fi nancial circumstances, 
lack of easy access to fi nancial capital, and reduced investment fl ows. These 
conditions arguably created a particular incentive to search for and imple-
ment logistical improvements, disembodied change that shows up largely 
in the TFP residual. If  this is so, the adversity of these years can be seen 
as having infl uenced not just the rate of  productivity change but also its 
character or direction.
The results of  these and other changes were signifi cant improvements 
in productivity over the course of  the Depression. Kendrick’s series for 
railroad sector output, drawn from Barger (1951), shows overall output 
(a weighted average of freight and passenger traffic) 5.5 percent higher in 
1941 than it was in 1929. Given the big declines in inputs, this was a very 
impressive achievement. Other factors, largely independent of the business 
cycle, certainly contributed to the strong productivity performance of rail-
roads during the Depression. For example, the buildout of the surface road 
network facilitated a growing complementarity between trucking and rails. 
But some of the productivity improvement resulted from responses internal 
to organizations. And whereas in households it is sometimes argued that 
memories are short and there is little permanent carryover of behavioral 
changes when times improve, institutional learning and memory particular 
to the corporate form probably allowed some hysteresis. Benefi cial organi-
zational innovations when times were poor persisted when times improved, 
and contributed to permanently higher levels of TFP, and the far superior 
performance of the US rail system in World War II as compared with the 
World War I.
In exploring this question, we need to keep the larger context in mind. 
If  we compare total gross domestic product (GDP) in 1929 and 1941 using 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s chained index number methodology, we 
see from the latest revisions that the aggregate grew at a continuously com-
pounded growth rate of 2.8 percent per year over that twelve- year period 
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(BEA 2011, NIPA Table 1.1.6). If  we make a cyclical adjustment, this rises 
to 2.97 per year (Field 2011b), close to the 3 percent per year often viewed 
as the long run “speed limit” for the US economy. The GDP surpassed its 
1929 level in 1936, and was 40 percent above its 1929 level by 1941. Because 
private sector labor and capital inputs increased hardly at all over that period 
(hours were fl at and net fi xed assets increased at only 0.3 percent per year 
 [http:/ / www.bea.gov, Fixed Asset Table 1.2]), virtually all of this was TFP 
growth. We would like to have a sense of  how much of  this, if  any, was 
the result of this adversity/ hysteresis effect, relative to the other two tribu-
taries.
If the adversity/ hysteresis mechanism has some empirical punch to it, then 
it is possible that the storm clouds of recession/ depression can have some-
thing of a silver lining. The disruption of credit availability and an increase 
in the cost of equity fi nance were both central features of the 1930s, just as 
their easy accessibility and cheap cost through most of the 1920s had been 
a feature of that decade. The boom/ bust cycle was associated with declining 
physical capital accumulation and productivity, particularly between 1929 
and 1933. At least in the case of railroads, however, there appear to have 
been longer run benefi ts to the downswing phase of the fi nancial cycle and 
the closely related cycle of physical accumulation in the form of technical 
innovation within the context of effective organizational responses.
12.1   Railroads and the Silver Lining
In the last part of the nineteenth century, railroads dominated the US 
economy in a way no other economic organization ever had or ever has 
again. They remained a formidable presence in the 1930s, although beset 
with challenges from several sides. What differentiated railroads from other 
parts of the private economy was the scale of their enterprise, particularly 
the size and value of the physical capital they owned, capital whose acquisi-
tion was fi nanced largely by borrowing. Coming out of the 1920s, railroads 
had huge fi xed nominal debt service obligations. They did not necessarily 
have to worry about rolling over short- term debt, since much of their bor-
rowing was in the form of long- term mortgages, but they still had to meet 
mandated payments. In the face of an economic downturn and wrenching 
changes in market opportunities associated with the growth of  trucking 
and the automobile, railroads were the poster child for Irving Fisher’s debt-
 defl ation thesis. By 1935, railroads responsible for more than 30 percent 
of fi rst track mileage were in receivership (fi gure 12.1), and this remained 
so for the remainder of the Depression. But the problems for the sector as 
a whole were in a sense less those of the roads in receivership, and more 
the challenges faced by those who were not. The former were actually less 
cash strapped than the latter. Railroad organizations were under enormous 
stress during the Depression, and so their productivity performance over 
this period is all the more remarkable.
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If  we ignore variations in income shares—which are relatively stable over 
time—a TFP growth rate calculation is basically a function of three num-
bers: the rate of growth of labor input, the rate of growth of capital input, 
and the rate of growth of output. Kendrick’s series for railroad output are 
drawn from Barger (1951) and are based on data for both freight and pas-
senger traffic, with a larger weight on freight. It shows output 5.5 percent 
higher in 1941 than it was in 1929. Kendrick’s labor input series are also 
from Barger and are identical to those that continue to be listed on the BEA 
website (NIPA Table 6.8A, line 39). Between 1929 and 1941, the number of 
employees declined 30.4 percent, employee hours 31.4 percent. Kendrick’s 
railway capital series is taken from Ulmer (1960), and shows a 1941 decline 
of  5.5 percent between 1929 and 1941. Putting these together, Kendrick 
has railway TFP rising at 2.91 percent per year over the twelve years of the 
Depression.
It is not possible, given currently available data, to do better than Kend-
rick for output and labor input. But the BEA’s revised Fixed Asset Tables do 
give us an opportunity to update capital input. Figure 12.2 brings together 
NIPA data on gross investment in railroad equipment and structures. Gross 
investment in railroad equipment peaks in 1923 and then moves fairly 
steadily downward to virtually nothing in 1933. It then revives somewhat, 
particularly after 1935 and the big increase in railroads in receivership. 
Investment in railroad structures peaks in 1926 but remains high through 
1930 before declining to a trough in 1933 and then recovering modestly 
during the remainder of the Depression, although not as sharply as equip-
ment investment. Using the data underlying these series, I calculate that 
Fig. 12.1 Mileage of railroads under receivership
Source: US Bureau of the Census (1937, 1944, 1947).
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between 1929 and 1941, the real net stock of railroad structures declined 
from $27 billion to $25.65 billion, and railroad equipment from $6.5 billion 
to $4.77 billion. Overall, then, the real net capital stock declined 9.2 percent 
over the twelve- year period, while Kendrick has it declining only 5.5 percent. 
(Kendrick 1961, Table G- III, 545). A more rapid decline in capital input 
(0.69 percent per year rather than 0.47 percent per year) would boost TFP 
growth in railways between 1929 and 1941 from 2.91 to 2.97 percent per 
year.8
We can get further insight into trends in railroad accumulation by look-
ing at detailed numbers on rolling stock (Figures 12.3, 12.4, and 12.5; these 
data are in units, not dollars). The locomotive numbers show decumulation 
in 1922 and then again starting in 1925. The number of locomotives then 
shrinks continuously until 1941. Some of this refl ects replacement of loco-
motives with larger, more powerful engines, but the overall trend is unmis-
takable. The total number of locomotives shrank from 61,257 in 1929 to 
44,375 in 1941. A small but growing number of replacement engines were 
Fig. 12.2 Gross investment in railroad equipment and structures
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis (2011) Fixed Asset Tables 2.7 and 2.8.
8. The difference between Kendrick’s capital input rate of  decline of  .47 and the rate of 
decline based on the latest BEA data (.69) is .22 percent per year, which, with a .25 weight 
on capital in the growth accounting equation, would add .055 percent per year to the sector’s 
TFP growth rate.
Fig. 12.3 Locomotives installed and retired, 1919– 1941
Source: US Bureau of the Census (1937, 1944, 1947).
Fig. 12.4 Freight cars installed and retired, 1919– 1941
Source: US Bureau of the Census (1937, 1944, 1947).
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diesel- electric; the count of such locomotives rose from 621 in 1929 to 895 
in 1941 (1944 Statistical Abstract, table 525, 473), while the average trac-
tive power of the remaining steam engines increased from 44,801 to 51,217 
pounds. Annual freight car data show continuous decumulation from 1920 
through 1939, with the exception of  1924 through 1926. Over the same 
period, aggregate freight car capacity in kilotons shrank from 105,411 to 
85,682 (1937 Statistical Abstract, table 427, 372; 1944 Statistical Abstract, 
table 523, 472). The replacement cars were, however, somewhat larger; aver-
age capacity rose from 46.3 to 50.3 tons between 1929 and 1941. Passenger 
car decumulation was modest through 1930, then increased dramatically 
through 1933. There was some recovery to lower rates of  decumulation, 
particularly after 1935, but the number of  passenger cars did not grow 
again until 1941 (fi gure 12.5). Numbers fell from 53,838 in 1929 to 38,344 
in 1941.
Figure 12.6 is of particular interest. It reports miles of road constructed 
and abandoned, with abandonments taking a sharp jump to a higher level 
in 1932, and new construction tapering off to virtually nothing by 1934. On 
the labor input side (fi gure 12.7), the number of railroad employees declined 
moderately in the 1920s, then precipitously in the 1930s (fi gure 12.7). Bring-
ing together all of these data on labor and capital inputs, we have a picture 
Fig. 12.5 Railroad passenger cars installed and retired, 1919– 1941
Source: US Bureau of the Census (1937, 1944, 1947).
Fig. 12.7 Railroad employees, 1919– 1941
Source: US Bureau of the Census (1937, 1944, 1947).
Fig. 12.6 Miles of road constructed and abandoned, all line haul steam railroads, 
1921– 1941
Source: Interstate Commerce Commission (1943, 14).
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of a system undergoing wrenching rationalization, rationalization midwifed 
by the economic downturn and the threat or actuality of receivership.
Figures 12.8 and 12.10 provide data on freight car miles and millions of 
passenger miles. Despite a net stock of structures that had fallen 6 percent 
since its peak in 1931, in spite of a labor force that was 30 percent smaller 
than it had been in 1929, and in spite of the fact that the real stock of railroad 
capital was a full one- third lower than it had been in 1929, revenue ton miles 
were 6 percent greater in 1941 than 1929.
The data on passenger miles show steadily declining output by this mea-
sure throughout the 1920s, testimony to the growing threat to passenger 
traffic posed by the automobile, and a sharp drop to 1933. But 1941 passen-
ger miles were within 6 percent of carriage in 1929. It is clear that since more 
freight was carried with many fewer freight cars, a substantial portion of the 
railway sector’s productivity gains came from increases in freight car capac-
ity utilization rates, which generated big increases in capital productivity. 
The ability to carry more freight and about the same number of passengers 
with much reduced numbers of locomotives, freight cars, and passenger cars 
also reduced the demand for railway structures: maintenance sheds, sidings, 
roundhouses, and so forth, which was serendipitous since the fi nancing for 
expanding the stock of structures was not readily available. The US railroad 
system was able in 1941 to carry more freight and almost as many passengers 
as it had in 1929 with substantially lower inputs of labor and capital. That 
meant, as a matter of defi nition, big increases in both labor productivity and 
TFP. By the end of the Depression, the US rail system was in much better 
shape than it had been at the start of World War I, and was able to cope with 
huge increases in both passenger and freight traffic during World War II. 
Figures 12.8, 12.9, and 12.10 include data on output over the war years. If  
one measures from 1929 through 1942, using Kendrick’s data, TFP in the 
sector grows by 4.48 percent per year.
Table 12.1 allows a closer examination of trends in and contributors to 
productivity increase. It shows the percent change in a variety of  input, 
output, and physical productivity measures between 1919 and 1929, 1929 
and 1941, and 1929 and 1942. It also reports the underlying data, as well as 
aggregate economic data for 1929, 1941, and 1942. The fi rst year of full scale 
war mobilization is 1942, and one can see in the aggregate data the partial 
crowding out of consumption and investment as a result of the doubling of 
government expenditure. Still, civilian unemployment averaged 4.7 percent 
for the year, and the distortions for the economy were not as extreme as in 
1943 and 1944. Therefore, there is some merit in calculating productivity 
growth in railroads between 1929 and 1942 as well as 1941, since the output 
gap in 1942 is closer to what it was in percentage terms in 1929. Also, since 
we are examining physical productivity measures, the distortions in pricing 
and valuation associated with wartime are somewhat less of a concern.
What these data show is that, overall, in spite of or perhaps in part because 
Fig. 12.8 Railroad freight car miles, 1920– 1946
Source: US Bureau of the Census (1937, 1944, 1947).
Fig. 12.9 Revenue freight ton miles, thousands, 1919– 1946
Source: US Bureau of the Census (1937, 1944, 1947).
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of the trying times, railroad productivity growth was signifi cantly stronger 
across the Depression years than it had been in the 1920s. An important 
measure of physical productivity is revenue ton miles per freight car, which 
grew 28.1 percent between 1919 and 1929, 42.3 percent from 1929 to 1941, 
and 86.5 percent between 1929 and 1942. Let’s look more closely at what 
underlay the Depression era increases. The total number of miles traversed 
by loaded freight cars in 1941 was approximately the same as it had been 
in 1929. The big driver of productivity improvement was that the number 
of  cars had declined 25.6 percent. The average capacity of  each car was 
somewhat greater—it had grown from 46.3 to 50.3 tons, making it easier 
to achieve a 6.1 percent increase in tons of revenue freight per loaded car. 
Overall, we can deduce that the average speed of each freight car (a function 
of average time stopped and average speed while in motion) had increased, 
since if  it had remained the same as it had been in 1929, the 25.6 percent 
decline in the number of cars would have reduced total freight car miles by 
a comparable percentage. We also know that the number of freight car load-
ings in thousands declined from 52,828 in 1929 to 42,352 in 1941; freight 
traveled on average a longer distance, refl ecting the inroads of trucking in 
shorter hauls.
In contrast, between 1919 and 1929, the number of cars stayed about the 
same, but total miles traversed by freight cars rose. Note, however, that miles 
booked by empty cars increased much faster than loaded miles during the 
1920s, whereas between 1929 and 1941, while the total number of loaded 
Fig. 12.10 Railroad passenger miles, millions, 1919– 1946
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miles remained unchanged, unloaded miles dropped. This decline is another 
refl ection of logistical improvement in railroad operations.
An alternate measure of the physical productivity of freight haulage is 
ton miles per mile of fi rst track. This grew more strongly in the 1920s than 
during the Depression years, although if  one measures to 1942 the reverse 
is true. Ton miles per employee, a rough measure of labor productivity in 
freight haulage, grew 41.9 percent during the 1920s, but 55.1 percent during 
the Depression (86.8 percent if  one measures to 1942).
Passenger miles per passenger car declined 19.6 percent during the 
1920s, but rose sharply across the Depression years—32.6 percent measur-
ing to 1941, 141.7 percent measuring to 1942. Finally, passenger miles per 
employee, which declined almost 12 percent during the 1920s, rose 37.9 
percent across the Depression years, 126.3 percent measuring through 
1942.
12.2   Firm- Level Analysis
Figures 12.1 through 12.10 and table 12.1 document at the sectoral level 
the productivity achievements of the US railway sector during the Depres-
sion years. This last section of the chapter examines the phenomenon at the 
level of individual railroads. I compare the labor productivity of 128 Class 
I railroads in 1941 with their performance in 1929. Data are from Statistics 
of Railways in the United States (1929), a volume published annually by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission. During the Depression Class I railroads 
were those with operating revenues greater than $1 million. The 1929 edition 
has data on 167 Class I railroads, covering the vast majority of operations 
in the United States. Total 1929 employment in the sector was 1,694,042 
(see fi gure 12.7); these 167 roads employed 1,662,095, or 98 percent of the 
total.
The 1941 ICC volume has data for 135 Class I railroads, employing 
1,139,129 out of total sector employment of 1,159,025 (again, 98 percent). 
Although most railroads in existence in 1929 persisted through 1941, the 
total number of Class I railroads did decline by about one- fi fth (19 percent).9 
In order to make meaningful comparisons between 1941 and 1929, we need 
to aggregate the data for some 1929 roads so that operational units are com-
parable to those existing in 1941. Where a number of railroads listed sepa-
rately in 1929 merged or were otherwise consolidated during the Depression 
years, the data for the multiple 1929 operational units are pooled. Table 
12.2 describes the linkages made between the railroad data in the two years. 
9. The threshold to be considered a Class I railroad rose with infl ation to $3 million in 1956, 
$5 million in 1965, $10 million in 1976, $50 million in 1978, and $250 million in 1993. Today the 
cutoff is $319.3 million. Whereas there were 135 Class I railroads operating in the United States 
in 1941, there are now only seven: Union Pacifi c, BNSF (Burlington Northern Santa Fe), CSX, 
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 Railroad history attracts interest from both professional and amateur histo-
rians and there is a wealth of information available on the web on the history 
of fi rm consolidation and corporate structure at different points in time. 
Using multiple searches, I have linked forty- three roads reporting in 1929 to 
fourteen roads in 1941, resulting on this account in a reduction of twenty-
 nine in the total number of  Class I railroads between the two years (see 
table 12.2). Two other railroads, both small, drop out because they ceased 
operations during the interval.10 For six other small railroads employing a 
total of 2,077 in 1929, I am not able to locate a successor.11 Four small roads 
employing a total of 827 appear in 1941 but not 1929.12 And I dropped two 
small lines, one, a small unit whose productivity numbers were an outlier, 
as well as a small railroad in Hawaii.13 I end up making 1929 through 1941 
comparisons for 128 linked units.
To compare labor productivity in the two years, we need a combined out-
put measure, which requires agreement on appropriate metrics for freight 
and passenger operations, and on how to aggregate them. For freight output, 
I use revenue ton miles; for passenger traffic, revenue passenger miles. I fi rst 
calculate the ratio of passenger revenue per passenger mile to freight revenue 
per ton mile, then use this ratio to convert passenger miles into “equivalent” 
freight ton miles. Adding this to freight ton miles yields, for each railroad, 
the output measure.
We have two basic types of output: passenger miles and freight ton miles. 
If  cents per ton mile and per passenger mile were the same for a railroad, 
then passenger miles would simply be added to freight ton miles for a com-
bined output measure. If  a railroad was earning 2 cents for a passenger mile 
versus 1 cent for a freight ton mile, then a passenger mile for that road would 
be converted to a freight ton equivalent at a ratio of 2:1. This procedure is 
similar to what Barger (1951) used for aggregate data. In cases where con-
solidation took place between 1929 and 1941, I divided the total equivalent 
freight ton miles for the multiple 1929 units by the total employment of the 
1929 roads to create a 1929 equivalent ton miles per employee that could 
then be compared with the 1941 measure.
The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) grouped Class I railroads 
into eight regions: New England (NE), Great Lakes (GL), Central East-
ern (CE), Pocahontas (PO), Southern (SO), Northwestern (NW), Central 
10. These two, with 1929 employment in parentheses, were Ft. Smith and Western (137), and 
Copper River and Northwestern (166).
11. These six, with their 1929 employment in parentheses, are Northern Alabama (412); 
Binghman and Garfi eld (256); Quincy, Omaha, and Kansas City (306); San Diego and Pacifi c 
(471); Wichita Valley (322); and Wichita Falls and Southern (310).
12. These four, with their 1941 employment in parentheses, are Cambria and Indiana (141); 
Spokane International (206); Colorado and Wyoming (413); and Oklahoma City, Ada, and 
Atoka (67).
13. These two roads were New York Connecting (with forty- nine employees in 1929), and 
Oahu Railroad and Land Company (with 407 employees in 1929).
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Western (CW), and Southwestern (SW). I begin by exploring regional varia-
tion in productivity levels in 1929 by regressing ton miles equivalents per 
employee on eight regional dummies (no constant), which essentially returns 
the average productivity level for railroads in each region (table 12.3).
Setting aside the Pocahontas region, which had assigned to it only four 
railroads, we note that in 1929 roads in the Central Eastern region tended to 
have somewhat higher output per employee, whereas the reverse was true for 
roads in the South. If  we now fast forward to 1941, we see that productivity 
grew quite substantially in every region. There had also been some conver-
gence, with particularly rapid growth among southern railroads and slower 
growth in the central eastern region. Still, the basic message conveyed by 
these data is that the productivity improvement in the railroad sector was a 
national phenomenon and aggregate advance was not driven, for example, 
by progress by a small number of large roads with disproportionate weight. 
In fact, an important negative result emerges from the statistical analysis: 
there is no statistically signifi cant or economically meaningful relationship 
between the size of a railroad as measured by the number of its employees 
and its productivity level in either 1929 or 1941.
Turning now to analysis of changes between 1929 and 1941, the results 
are somewhat different. I defi ne the dependent variable here as the percent-
age increase in output per employee between 1929 and 1941. The average 
increase in labor productivity over the course of the Depression for the 128 
railroad sample was 56 percent, but there was substantial variation, with 
a standard deviation of  43 percentage points. Within the context of  the 
general sectoral improvement, what factors particularly infl uenced whether 
a railroad performed relatively well or poorly on this dimension?
The following regression establishes several important relationships. The 
fi rst right- hand side variable demonstrates that productivity improvements 
across the Depression years involved predominantly the movement of freight. 
In table 12.4, the variable %FREIGHT1941 is the share of 1941 operating 
revenues originating from freight. The average for all roads was 92.6 per-
Table 12.3 Regional output per employee, US Class I railroads, 1929 and 1941
   1929  1941  % Increase  
NE 238,300 374,094 57.0
GL 320,279 469,096 46.5
CE 336,080 404,979 20.5
PO 573,978 903,237 57.4
SO 242,728 465,672 91.8
NW 298,608 437,729 46.6
CW 301,645 441,389 46.3
 SW  279,799  498,331  78.1  
Source: See text.
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cent, with a relatively low standard deviation of 9.8 percentage points. The 
measure varied from a high of 100 percent for railroads that carried no pas-
sengers to lows of 51 percent for Staten Island Rapid Transit, 64 percent for 
the Florida East Coast Line, and 69 percent for the New York, New Haven, 
and Hartford Railroad. What the positive coefficient on this variable shows 
is that, ceteris paribus, the greater the proportion of revenues from freight in 
1941, the greater the percentage increase in productivity between 1929 and 
1941. All else equal, a road with a 10 percentage point higher share of its 
operating revenues from freight traffic could expect a 9.2 percentage point 
higher increase in output per employee over the Depression. These numbers 
are consistent with the view that passenger carriage for American railroads 
was a mature business by the 1930s. Although it would experience its fi n-
est hour during World War II, it was already poised for decline. It was the 
freight, not the passenger side of business that was being transformed.
The second variable is a dummy for location of the railroad in the South. 
As table 12.3 shows, southern railroads achieved a particularly large increase 
in output per employee over the Depression. This refl ected catch up from 
the relative backwardness of the region in 1929, midwifed by such New Deal 
programs as the Tennessee Valley Authority, as well as the more general in-
fl uence of continued road building during the Depression (complementarity 
with the expansion of trucking, which benefi ted from improved roads, was 
a key feature in railroad productivity improvement throughout the coun-
try). The coefficient on this variable shows that, all else equal, a railroad in 
the South experienced a 41 percentage point higher increase in output per 
employee compared to a road with similar characteristics elsewhere in the 
country.
Finally, although the size of the railroad as measured by the number of 
its employees is irrelevant in accounting for levels of productivity in 1929 
or 1941, the change in employment (EMPLOYMENT) has a statistically 
signifi cant and economically important infl uence on how much produc-
tivity grew for that railroad over the twelve- year period. The relationship 
was inverse: the greater the percentage decline in employment, the higher 
the increase in output per employee. The average reduction in employment 
Table 12.4 Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression: Percent increase in output per 
employee, Class I railroads, United States, 1941 over 1929




 EMPLOYMENT  –0.40371  –2.63621  
Data sources: see text.
Note: n  128; R2  .24.
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across the 128 units was 30.4 percent, almost exactly the decline in the aggre-
gate numbers used by Barger and Kendrick. But there was substantial varia-
tion: the standard deviation across the roads was 22 percentage points.
This result is by no means obvious, necessary, or tautological. If  cutting 
employment in an organization were an automatic route to higher labor pro-
ductivity, the road to economic progress would be a lot less obstructed. The 
facts are that simply fi ring employees or reducing employee rolls by attrition 
can easily cause output to fall as fast or faster than employment. After all, 
there was a reason the employees were hired in the fi rst place. The trick was 
and is to reduce employment in a well- thought out fashion that is coordi-
nated with changes in equipment, structures, and logistics and allows output 
to be sustained, or at least to decline at a slower rate than employment.
The aggregate data show that rising labor productivity coincided with 
declining employment. The fi rm- level analysis provides evidence indica-
tive of a behavioral relationship. As noted, the average decline in employ-
ment was 30.4 percent. According to the regression results, a railroad for 
which employment declined an additional 10 percentage points would have 
enjoyed, over the twelve years of the Depression, a 4 percentage point larger 
increase in output per worker.
But what interpretation can we give to this result? A labor historian might 
say that it simply refl ected speed up—the lines had become better at extract-
ing more labor from each individual. That may have been true to some 
extent. But I believe we can also give it a broader and more positive spin. The 
ability to shrink payrolls by margins this large while at the same time sustain-
ing and in many cases increasing output required logistical and technological 
innovation, not just a more effective managerial use of the whip.
Many aspects of the story suggested by the aggregate data are consistent 
with what the fi rm- level analysis tells us. Productivity improvement was a 
national phenomenon, affecting railroads both large and small. Innova-
tions involved principally the logistics of moving freight, not passengers. 
Southern railroads, laggards on average in 1929, experienced the largest 
regional productivity improvements. And at the level of individual railroads, 
those with higher percentage declines in employment over the twelve years 
of the Depression reaped correspondingly higher increases in output per 
employee.
12.3   Conclusion
The Depression era history of  the US rail system provides a compel-
ling example of the operation of the adversity/ hysteresis effect. Faced with 
tough times in the form of radically changing demand conditions, crushing 
debt burdens, and lack of  access to more capital, railroad organizations 
reduced their main trackage, rolling stock and employees, in most cases quite 
dramatically. At the same time, they introduced upgraded locomotives and 
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rolling stock as they were replaced, built more secondary trackage, chang-
ing their operating procedures as they introduced new systems for logistical 
control and freight interchange. In spite of these cuts, output nonetheless 
grew modestly to the beginning of the war and rapidly during it.
It is true that the sector faced tough times in the quarter century following 
the war as it struggled with the continued erosion of its passenger business 
and the reality that trucking also threatened its long haul freight revenues. 
But, after sloughing off commuter lines to state agencies and the remaining 
intercity passenger business to government- owned Amtrak, it emerged by 
the last decades of the twentieth century in relatively good shape, displaying 
strong productivity growth, testimony once again to the railroad sector’s 
ability to reenergize and reinvigorate itself  in the face of adversity.
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Comment William Kerr
This chapter by Alexander Field is a very interesting contribution to the con-
ference volume. Lacking a strong background in economic history, my com-
ments are less about the specifi cs of the railroad industry during the Great 
Depression. Instead, I focus on my major takeaways from Alex’s chapter and 
their parallels to the experiences of the US banking industry. I then apply 
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